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 Slosh dynamics are generally modeled as a spring/mass (or pendulum) model.
• Linear model, easily implemented.
 To ensure stability, generally weight-intensive baffling is added to the tanks to 
keep slosh motion small.
• Baffling is essentially found in every vehicle where slosh is a concern, physically to 
ensure small slosh motion, and analytically to allow the use of simplified linear 
models. 





 Two notable slosh-induced instabilities in Launch Vehicles:
• SpaceX Falcon 1 Demo Flight 21
– Vehicle oscillations in pitch/yaw due LOX slosh ~90 seconds into flight during 
Second Stage, and induced roll torque. 
– Roll torque overcame the RCS thrusters and centrifuged the propellants, 
causing engine flame-out. 
– Falcon 1 did not use slosh baffles in the second stage tanks.
– Apparently, preflight analysis relied on time-domain simulation, and failed to 
adequately capture all slosh transient dynamics during ascent flight.
– Extensive 2nd stage slosh baffles added, as is currently the case with the 1st 
stage. 
• Saturn Test Flight SA-12
– Slosh instability occurred in lower region of tanks, below the last baffle.
– Slosh instability started as linear motion and transitioned to rotary motion.  
– Last minute flight control design change was implemented to protect for late-
test data input, which added ill-advised lag at slosh frequencies.
– New design did not go through same rigor as initial design.
– Slosh instability resulted in premature engine cut-off.
– Solution was to add more baffles, including anti-vortex.
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 If flight control analysis can model/design-to higher-fidelity (including nonlinear) slosh 
dynamics, it is possible to remove conservatism in GNC design, hence increasing 
vehicle performance while decreasing vehicle weight (less baffles)?
 Particularly challenging to GNC designers, when using conservative linear slosh 
models, is the temptation to significantly baffle secondary tanks. 
 There is precedence for “cashing in” on higher fidelity slosh models and analyses 
approaches to remove conservatism in launch vehicle GNC design:
1. Slosh damping increases with slosh amplitude (nonlinear effect), so can we design to a 
nonlinear slosh model?
– Process requires derivation of a model of nonlinear relationship between slosh amplitude and 
slosh damping.
2. Can metrics (or rule of thumbs) be defined where slosh dynamics are considered second order 
effects and hence not considered in the design?
– Can tanks with a small slosh mass, or a small tank radius, be ignored? 
3. Is it acceptable to fly-through a potential slosh instability?
 Presentation will briefly address these questions.
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First Question:  nonlinear slosh model 
use?
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1. Slosh damping increases with slosh amplitude (nonlinear effect), so 
can GN&C design to a nonlinear slosh model/dynamics?
• Process requires derivation of a model of nonlinear relationship 
between slosh amplitude and slosh damping.
 Shuttle used nonlinear slosh model to support flight control certification where low-
damping slosh modes proved very challenging with traditional linear control design 
approaches3.
• Shuttle “Marble in a Bowl” model increases damping when slosh pendulum mode 
displacement exceeds 20 deg.
Shuttle Heritage:  Nonlinear Slosh Model 
used in Shuttle FCS Certification
7
This model was 
apparently used for 
all Shuttle tanks, 
regardless of smooth 
wall vs baffle design.
3. “Space Shuttle Ascent FCS STIVANS (Time Domain) program Documentation”, SSD93D0594 Rev A, Rockwell International, September 10, 1996.
 Shuttle stability certification process allowed waiver for reduction in frequency 
domain stability margin requirements provided time domain criterion is met4.
 Time domain criterion is related to allowable vehicle rate transients for given input 
attitude command (doublet):
Time Domain Performance Criterion with Nonlinear 
Slosh
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From Ascent Flight Control System Stability Assessments”, SSD94D0289, 
Rockwell International, September 30, 1994.
 If slosh-mass-to-vehicle-mass ratio is small, is there a threshold on this ratio where slosh 
dynamics can be ignored in GN&C design?
1. Is there a shuttle precedent?  A comment from shuttle LOX damping documentation5: 
– “The [Shuttle LOX tank baffle] requirement defines the minimum slosh damping between the fluid levels where 
the slosh mass is greater than 10% of the total vehicle mass.  Within this critical slosh region, the slosh 
suppression system must provide the required minimum slosh damping in order to meet guidance stability 
margins defined by the Rockwell International (RI) guidance and control group”.
2. SLS also uses slosh inertia (slosh_mass*moment_arm^2/I_vehicle) to get  initial indication of  
sensitivity to slosh mass.
 If the slosh amplitude which could cause instability exceeds the actual tank radius, can this be a 
mitigation factor for slosh instability concerns?  A comment from Shuttle Thrust Vector Control 
(TVC) stability analysis:
– “In addition, an analytical derivation of possible OMS propellant slosh effect has shown that its effect would be so 
small that the worst case (i.e., all slosh masses in the OMS tanks acting in unison starting with the maximum 
possible initial slosh displacement) would result in body rates which would not exceed the rate gyro quantization 
levels. For this reason the slosh model was not incorporated in this simulation or in any verification work.”
 SLS has not been able to obtain confidence in a “rule of thumb” derivation based on slosh mass, 
slosh inertia, or tank radius thresholds where slosh dynamics can be ignored.  
Question 2:  Can metrics (or rule of thumbs) be defined where slosh 
dynamics are considered second order and hence not considered in the 
design?
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Third Question:  Is it acceptable to fly-through a 
potential slosh instability?
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 If slosh dynamics can be proven to not couple with flex modes, is it feasible to “fly-through” slosh instabilities?
 “Time to Double” is a metric than can be used to quantity acceptable divergence (say in attitude or gimbal 
command).
 Shuttle time-domain “limit cycle” amplitude performance does allow short duration low amplitude divergence in 
time-domain simulation
 SLS general rule is flight control design will not allow vehicle to “fly-through” instabilities.  
Shuttle (LOX)
“Figures 4.2.1-1 through 21 
show the roll, pitch, and yaw 
attitude responses and 
normal and lateral 
accelerations. As can be 
observed, nearly all the 
linear, time domain results 
are well below the limit-cycle 
criteria of 0.5 deg and 0.1 g 
(peak-to-peak); however, at 
T440 a very slow divergence 
in all 3 axes can be seen. 
Figures 4.2.1-22 and 23 at 
T430 and T460 show that the 
vehicle is subject to this 
(T440) marginal stability for 
less than 30 seconds.”
 Lesson’s Learned shows GN&C designers should use a conservative approach when 
designing baffle hardware to supply slosh damping.
 Standard approach calls for use of linear spring-mass-damper model (or pendulum 
equivalent) slosh model when designing control system.
• Provides a conservative design approach, however arguably overly conservative when dealing 
with secondary tanks and/or with smaller slosh masses.
– Note SpaceX slosh instability example was second stage.
• Pressure will exist to remove conservatism in GNC design, in  particular with regard to slosh in 
secondary tanks, to save vehicle mass (do not over-baffle).
 Precedence exists for using higher fidelity slosh models and flight control analysis to 
remove conservatism and same mass (fewer baffles).
• Model nonlinear effects, key one is slosh damping increase with slosh amplitude.
• Is it feasible to derive rules of thumb where linear slosh model approach is too conservative?
– Possible metric:  slosh-mass-to-vehicle-mass ratio
– Possible metric:  slosh amplitude compared to tank radius
– ?
• Is it feasible to allow violations of slosh linear stability margin criterion if time-domain 
performance is deemed acceptable?
– Shuttle defined peak limit cycles in vehicle attitude and linear acceleration to gather confidence 
that linear stability margin violations were acceptable.
Concluding Thoughts
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 Another example of Shuttle flight control engineers using a nonlinear dynamics 
model in flight control design/certification.
Backup
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Example of Nonlinear Structural Dynamics Used in Shuttle GNC 
Design/Certification (freeplay at Shuttle/ISS docking interface)
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Modal Frequency 
Varies as a function 
of Modal Amplitude
STS-92:  Shuttle Reboost of ISS with Nonlinear 
Dynamics
Interface dynamics transitioned from nonlinear 
dynamics to linear dynamics upon pressurization of 
shuttle airlock.
STS-92 Nonlinear Dynamics:  
Shuttle/3A Pitch Rate (deg/sec) During Reboost
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